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Introduction
In recent years there has been a signi…cant increase of private sector participation in the provision of public utilities. Besides the evident failure of many state-provided services, this process has been driven by the need for increased capital investments and the lack of public …nancial resources (Dosi and Muraro, 2003) .
In this context, concessions play a key role, in those sectors (e.g. water services) where natural monopoly conditions persist, and "competition for the market" is the only viable option to achieve e¢ ciency gains. Under concession contracts, the goverment retains ownership of the infrastructure but transfers all risk and responsibility for running the utility, including responsibility for …nancing investments (Marin, 2002) .
When assigning a concession contract, the regulator faces inter alia the issue of setting the concession length. Another key issue is the degree of managerial ‡exibility, namely whether or not the concessionaire should be allowed to set the timing of new investments.
In this paper we focus on the impact of concession length and investment ‡exibility on "concession value" leaving aside the problems arising from asymmetric information, and ignoring other public objectives 1 . In other words, we assume that the government wishes to maximize the value of the contract, in order to make it more appealing. Some of the bene…ts arising from a privately optimal contract could be extracted through concession fees or eventually transferred to consumers, in terms of a reduction in tari¤s or an increase in the quality of the service.
We carry out the analysis referring to the real option literature which, starting from the seminal works by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986) has highlighted the analogy between security options and investment ‡exibility. Since concessionaires must typically bear substantial capital expenditure, under uncertainty, the ability to wait and see before committing a capital outlay has an intrinsic value, since it allows the concessionaire to avoid costly errors.
The questions addressed in the paper may be summarised as follows. Does investment timing ‡exibility always increase the concession value? How 1 There is a debate in literature about the optimal length of a concession contract. Under long -term contracts the regulator may be "captured"by the concessionaire because of asymmetric information (Williamson, 1985; Posner, 1972) . On the other hand, shortterm contracts may lead the concessionaires to under-invest since the return period is too short (La¤ont and Tirole, 1993; Armstrong et al.,1994; Littlechild, 2004). should concession length be determined in order to maximize the concession value when the concessionaire has no obligations with regards to the investment timing?
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple real option model to evaluate the concession value (the concession's extended present value). In Section 3 we apply the model by analysing an investment decision in capacity expansion (a new abstraction plant), using data drawn from the Italian water service sector. Section 4 provides a brief summary of the …ndings.
In order to calculate the project's value we must consider its operating life (economic life) T c . In other words, whenever the concessionaire decides to defer the investment, she reduces the time over which pro…ts can be gained by running the utility. According to assumption 4, the residual value is described as a percentage of the replacement cost. This percentage depreciates at rate over the remaining years until the end of the concession. Therefore, if the …rm invests at = 0 the residual value is equal to zero, while if the …rm invests close to the end of the concession, = T c , the residual value coincides with the replacement cost.
The market value of the project can be evaluated as the expected present value of discounted cash ‡ows:
(1 e (Tc ) ) + Ie (r+ ) (Tc ) where E denotes the expectation operator under the risk neutral probability measure (Cox and Ross, 1976; . Given the above assumptions, the value of the opportunity to invest, i.e. the project's Extended Net Present Value, is analogous to a European call option on a constant dividend-paying asset:
whereV ( ) (1 e (Tc ) );Î = I(1 e (r+ )(Tc ) ); is the expiration date and the project cash ‡ow at time . The solution of (3) is given by the well-known formula derived by Black and Scholes (1973) :
where: 
3 The case of a water abstraction plant
The Italian water sector represents an interesting case study to apply the above model. First of all, Italy has undergone a reform over the past decade which has established a separation between water resource planning and the operation of water utilities. Under Law n 36/94, resource planning is assigned to the local water authority, called ATO, 4 which assigns the operation of water services to a concessionaire and …xes the tari¤. 56 Besides ensuring the maintenance of existing infrastructures, the concessionaire must typically undertake new investments in order to ful…ll the standards set by the ATO and to expand service capacity. 7 Secondly, the water sector is characterized by a wide range of feasible alternative technical solutions planners can choose from as far as the operation and management of the water utilities are concerned. Technological innovations have led to the construction of complex systems allow for high operational ‡exibility. It is quite common today to design vertical integrated systems with several interconnections between the network infrastructures, which can be expanded by sequential or modularized investments. Such systems can easily be modi…ed over time in order to face and adapt to changes in the state variables (e.g. average day demand, number of users, input costs, etc.). This ‡exibility, which arises from technical aspects, has an economic value that is related to the concessionaire's "ability"to decide whether and when it is optimal to invest in capacity expansion.
By referring to the case of a new water abstraction plant, this section investigates the relationship between concession length and investment timing as well as the e¤ect of concession length on concession value (Extended Net Present Value).
The data
In order to meet the contract requirements, the Italian concessionaires have two alternatives. One option is to provide the service by buying water via another …rm. In this case we assume the NPV is equal to zero since the price of traded water is established by the ATOs according to "solidarity and fairness criteria". Alternatively, the concessionaire may invest in capacity expansion. This can be done by constructing a new water abstraction plant of dimension X.
Assuming a pro…t function linear in X, we obtain:
where R t are the revenues per cubic meter, C t the operating costs per cubic meter, X the plant's capacity (m 3 ) and i the volume losses in the network. We also make the following assumptions:
1. Revenues are non stochastic since the tari¤s are set by the regulator over the entire concession period.
2. Operating costs are stochastic and follow a geometric Brownian motion with a growth rate (r ) and volatility :
The risk-free discount rate r is constant over time.
4. The project's residual value at the end of its lifetime is zero. 8 Given the above assumptions, the present value of the project is:
while the Extended Net Present Value is given by:
In detail, the water abstraction plant is made up of: a) a well …eld (3 wells); b) a pumping station; c) a treatment plant; d) a storage system (capacity equal to 10,000 m 3 ); e) a treatment plant; f) an electrical system for the equipment installed. The treatment plant includes a …ltration process on Granular Activated Carbon (GAC) and the storage system includes disinfection and chlorination procedures. 9 The system guarantees a water provision of about 300 l/s (equivalent to 9,460,800 m 3 =year) but it is subject to water losses in the network (i = 20%). We assume that the plant's construction and installment costs are not time-dependent and amount to about 3,500,000 Euros. Designers and industry experts interviewed agree on estimating the average operational costs of this type of plant at around 0.13 Euro/m 3 .
Revenues per cubic meter have been determined by a statistical analysis performed over a distribution whose parameters have been estimated on the basis of the average tari¤ paid by users for the provision of drinking water.
The risk-free rate is assumed to be equal to the rate of return of on? stated-owned bonds.
The variance has been estimated considering analogous investment projects carried out in the past, whose operating costs were known throughout the project life. 
The results
The main results are illustrated in Figure 1 , which describes the Extended Net Present Value (F ) for di¤erent concession lengths T c = f10; 15; 20; 25; 30; 35; 40g, and di¤erent exercise times . 10 
Figure 1 about here
The concession value is concave in exercise time . This implies that for given T c we may …nd an interior investment time ( ) which maximizes the concession value F .
By observing Figure 1 several conclusions can be drawn:
1. Let's …rst consider the case where the regulator arbitrarily sets T c and allows the concessionaire to choose the investment time ( ). The optimal investment time ( ), which maximizes the Extended Net Present Value, varies depending on T c . For example, assuming T c = 40 years, F has a maximum for = 17 years. Everything else being equal, if T c is reduced to 30 years, becomes 9 years. Finally, if T c = 15 years concession value F consistently decreases in so that it is optimal to invest immediately (i.e. = 0). In this case, the investment timing ‡exibility allowed by the regulator does not increase the project's value (F N P V ). 11 2. Let's now consider how the optimal concession length (T c ) is a¤ected by . The optimal T c is the one maximizing F: If is equal to zero (i.e. no ‡exibility is allowed by the regulator), the concession value collapses to the conventional N P V . In this case, T c can be chosen by ranking the N P V s: more speci…cally, the maximun N P V correponds to T c = 20 years. On the contrary, if > 0, the optimal concession length should be chosen by ranking the F s: For example, if the concessionaire is allowed to defer the investment for 5 years (i.e. = 5), the optimal concession length is T c = 25 years, while if = 10 years, the maximun F correponds to T c = 30 years.
1 0 According to assumption 4, when is equal to Tc (i.e. when the concession contract ceases), we get F = 0. 1 1 The relationship between and Tc can be described by a linear function: If we put the above results together, we …nd that in order to maximize the concession value, the regulator should determine the couple (T c ; ) that maximizes F (Figure 2 ). In our example, the maximum F is obtained, approximately, when T c = 25 years and = 5 years. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigated how the concession length and investment timing ‡exibility a¤ect the concession value. It is generally argued that long-term contracts are privately valuable as they allow a concessionaire to increase her overall discounted returns. Moreover, the real option theory suggests that investment ‡exibility has a value, as it makes it possible to avoid costly errors. By combining these two conventional wisdoms, one may argue that long-term contracts, embedding investment timing ‡exibil-ity, should always result in higher concession values. Our results suggest that this is not always the case, since there is not a monotone relationship between the Extended Net Present Value and concession length. Firstly, investment ‡exibility does not always increase the concession value. For example, under a short-term contract, the concessionaire's ability to defer irreversible investments may not provide additional value, since it becomes optimal to invest immediately (the concession's Extended Net Present Value coincides with to the conventional Net Present Value).
Secondly, long-term contracts do not necessarily increase the concession value. Since the duration of the concession contract a¤ects the optimal investment timing, if a concession contract is "too long", the concessionaire may be forced to postpone investments in order to reduce the uncertainty over future returns. Again, this may result in a lower Extended Net Present Value. 
